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STUDENT SYMPOSIUM
A STUDY OF TEXAS USURY LAW
I.

THE REGULATION OF INTEREST; PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
EARLY REGULATION
FORREST M. SMITH, III

The exaction of excessive interest,' more commonly referred to as usury,'
has been described as "one of the oldest professions of man. "I The matter
of regulating usurious transactions historically stemmed from important
moral considerations, and was not simply a problem of economic fact
finding and rate setting.' Although the designation of permissible maximum rates of interest did not develop solely because of moralistic concerns,' ecclesiastical condemnation for moral reasons played a dominant
role.'
In the Old Testament of the Bible, not only was excess interest denounced, but the taking of any amount of interest was adjudged a breach
of brotherly love.' The leaders of the early church considered it abhorrent
1. "'Interest' is the compensation allowed by law for the use or forbearance or detention of money ...... TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1971). The use
referred to is the one contracted for when the loan is made. The forbearance arises when a
debt is due and the parties agree to extend the time for payment. Detention occurs when
the debt has become due and the debtor withholds payment without the authority to do so.
See Parks v. Lubbock, 92 Tex. 635, 637, 51 S.W. 322, 323 (1899); Jones v. United States &
Mexican Trust Co., 105 S.W.328, 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ).
2. "'Usury' is interest in excess of the amount allowed by law." TEx. REv. Civ. STAT,
ANN. art. 5069-1.01(d) (Vernon 1971). The etymology of the word usury is the Latin usa and
aera, meaning "the use of money." Bernstein, Background of a Gray Area in the Law: The
Checkered Career of Usury, 51 A.B.A.J. 846, 847 (1965).
3. See Bernstein, Background of a Gray Area in the Law: The Checkered Career of
Usury, 51 A.B.A.J. 846, 846 (1965).
4. Meth, A Contemporary Crisis: The Problem of Usury in the United States, 44
A.B.A.J. 637, 637 (1958).
5. An additional concern was the welfare of the poor. So-called consumer loans, to profit
from others' poverty, were never approved. See Bernstein, Background of a Gray Area in the
Law: The Checkered Career of Usury, 51 A.B.A.J. 846, 849 (1965).
6. See J. NOONAN, THE SCHoLAsnc ANALYSIS OF USURY 3 (1957). The Bible, writings of
the early church fathers against usury, and condemnations by early church councils all
combined to form early opinions of usury. Id. at 11.
7. See Meth, A Contemporary Crisis: The Problem of Usury in the United States, 44
A.B.A.J. 637, 637 (1958). A passage extracted from Deuteronomy reads, "Thou shall not lend
upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of anything that is lent
upon usury.
See Deuteronomy 23: 19-20. "And if thy brother be waxen poor ... thou
shalt relieve him . .

.

.Take thou no usury of him, or increase; but fear God .... " See

Ezekiel 18: 5,13. "If a man hath given forth upon usury, and hath taken increase; shall he
live? He shall not live .. .he shall surely die." See also Leviticus 25: 35-36, Psalms 15:5;
St. Matthew 25:27; Luke 19:23.
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that money should increase unnaturally while lying fallow., Laws, however, had not always been so strict. For instance, the Babylonian Code of
Hammurabi, the laws of early Greece, and the ancient Twelve Tablets of
Rome all allowed interest on credit, but put a ceiling upon legally chargeable rates.' By the Middle Ages, when Christian doctrines dominated the
thought patterns of Western European civilizations, habitual usury was
cause for excommunication, a penalty amounting to a denial of the sacraments and outcasting by society. 0
The distinction between interest and usury was slow to develop in the
common law; the word interest originally had the same meaning as that
now conveyed by the word usury." During the reformation a twofold
change occurred in the idea that the taking of any interest was usurious.',
First, there was a slackening of restrictions pertaining to interest in that
the receipt of interest, in itself, was no longer considered usurious.' 3 A
8. See Bernstein, Background of a Gray Area in the Law: The Checkered Career of
Usury, 51 A.B.A.J. 846, 847 (1965). "That a lender should profit in his own idleness and that
a borrower should be charged even though he may not have lost money in the transaction,
both were intolerable." Id. at 847.
9. The Code of Hammurabi, formed by the king of ancient Babylon in about 1800 B.C.,
regulated the debtor-creditor relationship. The maximum rate allowable was set at thirtythree and one-third percent per annum for loans of grain repayable in kind, and twenty
percent per annum on loans of silver by weight. If more than the legal rate was collected the
principal was cancelled. See S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 4 (1963). The early laws
of China absolutely prohibited interest in any form. See id. The Mosaic Laws allowed Jews
to exact interest only from Gentiles. See A. FoLsoM, A SUMMARY OF USURY LAws AND DECISIONS
2 (1927). Around 600 B.C., the recorded legal history of Greece began with the laws of Solon,
in which all limits on the rate of interest were abolished. See S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST
RATES 4 (1963). The Greeks held in contempt, however, anyone actually charging more than
twelve percent per year interest. See 91 C.J.S. Usury § 2 (1955). The Romans' recorded legal
history began with the Twelve Tablets, dating around 450 B.C. The laws regulating credit
limited interest on loans to no more than eight and one-third percent per year. Higher charges
were penalized by fourfold damages. See S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 4 (1963).
10. See generally J. NOONAN, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 16, 34-35 (1957); R. TYLER,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF USURY, PAWNS OR PLEDGES, AND MARITIME LOANS 37 (1878).
11. This refusal of the common law courts to recognize the legitimacy of returns upon
money capital has been cited as one of the historical reasons for the use of language of
conveyance in a mortgage. See Humble Refining Co. v. Atwood, 244 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex.
1952).
During a long period any return upon a loan might be declared usury . . . and the
unfortunate creditor subjected to fine, imprisonment, ransom at the king's pleasure,
and exposure on the 'pillare, to their open rebuke and shame.' So the creditors sought
refuge in their feudal tenures and secured a return upon their loans in the form of rents
and profits, accompanying the right of possession.
Id. at 639. See generally A. FOLSOM, A SUMMARY OF USURY LAWS AND DECISIONS 1, 3 (1927); J.
NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY 20 (1957); R. TYLER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
USURY, PAWNS OR PLEDGES, AND MARITIME LOANS 37 (1878); J. WEBB, LAW OF USURY 1 (1899).
12. See generally B. NELSON, THE IDEA OF USURY 29 (1969).
13. See Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A Study of the Texas
Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 234 (1968).
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change in the focal point of the usury inquiry also took place as the inquisition shifted from the moral status of the lender to an examination of the
social and economic effect of the act itself. 4 In England, the eventual result
of this transition was the codification of permissible interest rates in the
Statute of Anne.'" The codification, however, failed the test of time, and
the Statute of Anne was repealed in 1854.1 During the next forty-six years,
until the Money-Lenders Act of 1900,17 England had no legal interest rate
maximum. The Statute of Anne, although abolished by its founders,
served as a blueprint for the drafters of usury laws in American colonial
legislation."'
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

By 1844, every state in the United States had some form of usury legislation.' In consonance with the then current laissez-faire doctrine, 0 most
European nations were in the process of repealing their usury laws. 2' During that period, individual wage earners in the United States were living
at a bare subsistence level and could not afford a loan at any rate of
14. See id. at 234.
15. Statute of Anne, 1713, 12 Anne, c. 16; see Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to
Current Convenience-A Study of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 234 (1968).
16. See Bernstein, Background of a Gray Area in the Law: The Checkered Career of
Usury, 51 A.B.A.J. 846, 847 (1965)(citing 17 & 18 Vict., c. 90 (1854) which repealed the
Statute of Anne). During the debates on the proposed repeal of the statute, members of
Parliament in favor of such a move argued that there was nothing immoral about usury and
also that "God did not so hate it, that he utterly forbade it." See id. at 848.
17. See Meth, A Contemporary Crisis: The Problem of Usury in the United States, 44
A.B.A.J. 637, 640 (1958) (citing 63 & 64 Vict., c. 51 (1900)). By the enactment of the Money
Lender's Act the Chancery was given the power to reopen all transactions involving interest,
relieve the borrower from excess rates, order repayment of any excess paid, and set aside harsh
or unconscionable security arrangements. See id. at 640. For an analysis of the effectiveness
of this approach, see Note, An Ounce of Discretionfor a Pound of Flesh: A Suggested Reform
for Usury Laws, 65 YALE L.J. 105, 109-10 (1955).
18. See A. FoLsoM, A SUMMARY OF UsUvY LAws AND DECISIONS 5, 6 (1927).
19. See Comment, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of the Lex Debitoris, 55
CAL. L. R~v. 123, 131 (1967).
20. According to laissez-faire doctrines, money should be left free in the markets and
uncontrolled, like other goods. See Bernstein, Background of a Gray Area in the Law: The
Checkered Career of Usury, 51 A.B.A.J. 846, 849 (1965). Economists had discovered that
money does have an exchange value. This, coupled with the belief that anything leading to
an expanding economy was morally just, produced fertile grounds for the flourishing of
laissez-faire economic doctrines. See Meth, A Contemporary Crisis: The Problem of Usury
in the United States, 44 A.B.A.J. 637, 637-38 (1958).
21. See A. NussAuM, MONEY INTHE LAw 237-38 (1939). England led the way by repealing
the Statute of Anne in 1854. Others followed suit: Denmark in 1855, Spain in 1856, Holland,
Sardinia, Norway and Geneva in 1857, Saxony and Sweden in 1864, Belgium in 1865, Prussia
and the North German Confederation in 1867. Relief from oppressive interest rates was left
to the courts. Id.
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interest; they therefore had no need for the fundamentally protective functions of usury laws. 2 The rapidly growing commercial interests had no
need of usury protection either, since they were experiencing tremendous
profits. 3 Most states, following the European example, either repealed or
made their usury laws much less restrictive.24
After 1900, however, as the economy in America shifted from capital to
consumer goods, the necessity for the protection of usury laws increased."
In order to purchase high cost products, consumers needed credit." Since
wages had increased from the level of the 1800's, consumers could afford
to borrow at interest. 7 State legislatures, realizing the possibility for exploitation by creditors, began to set lower and more stringent interest
maximums.28 From the early 1900's until 1958, at least eighteen states
reduced their allowable interest ceilings. 9
During the past several decades the United States has experienced a
tremendous explosion in the growth of consumer credit. 0 The result of this
growth has been legislative recognition of the importance of credit in
today's economy, and of the possibilities for abuse that exist in both the
consumer and commercial marketplaces.' Thus, simple biblical directives
against usury 32 have been supplanted by an extremely complex set of rules,
regulations, and statutes in an attempt to restrain credit abuses.
22. See B.

CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION

2 (1965).

23. Id.
24. See J. WEBB, LAW OF USURY 621-71 (1899). By 1900, eleven states, mostly in the
western United States, no longer imposed interest rate ceilings. Nine states, including Texas,
allowed interest between ten and twelve percent. Id. It was argued by advocates of repeal that
attempts to fix the price of money would drive capital into foreign markets, restricting its
circulation, and would lead to evasion of usury laws by lenders, thus creating higher effective
interest rates. See Comment, Usury and the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of the Lex
Debitoris, 55 CAL. L. REv. 123, 132 (1967). Assertive pressure by advocates, coupled with the
explosion of industry in the Industrial Revolution, caused laissez-faire doctrines to prevail.
See id. at 133.
25. See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER LEGISLATION 1 (1965).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Meth, A Contemporary Crisis: The Problem of Usury in the United States, 44
A.B.A.J. 637, 640 (1958).
29. See id. at 640.
30. See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER LEGISLATION 1 (1965). There are two distinctions
that must be made between consumer legislation and usury legislation. First, since credit
extended by a seller to a buyer has not been considered a loan, interest payments for this
credit have been held to fall outside the scope of usury laws. See Comment, Usury in the
Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of Lex Debitoris, 55 CAL. L. REv. 123, 135 (1967). Second,
consumer credit legislation has traditionally been concerned more with disclosure of information to the buyer than with regulation of interest rates, usury laws' primary function. Id. at
135.
31. See Declaration of Legislative Intent, 15 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. 1-2 (Vernon
1971).
32. See Deuteronomy 23: 19-20; Ezekiel 18:5, 13; Leviticus 25: 35-36; Psalms 15:5; St.
Matthew 25:27; Luke 19:23.
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TEXAS -CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Today all but a few of the fifty states have some form of usury regulation. 31 Contemporary usury statutes perform the chief function of borrower
protection." Usury laws are based upon the premise that the bargaining
power of the two parties in a loan transaction is not equal: greed, compelling necessity, shortsightedness, a gullibility deprives the debtor of the
ability to freely enter a loan transaction and places him at the mercy of
the lender.38 The Declaration of Legislative Intent to the Texas Credit Code
indicates that protection of the borrower from unscrupulous creditors is
still the main function of the Texas usury statutes."
Texas was without the protective functions of usury laws after 1869,
when the legislature abolished interest'regulation and forbade any limitations to the exaction of interest on loans. 7 This situation, however, lasted
only seven years. Because the 1869 repeal resulted in an immediate rash
of credit abuses, necessity warranted the reenactment of usury provisions
in the constitution of 1876.38 The 1876 constitution prohibited interest rates
above twelve percent per annum when the rate was agreed upon by the
parties, but when no rate was contracted for, the maximum was set at eight
percent. 31 In 1891, the limit was lowered to the present ceiling of ten percent per year for contracted for rates, and six percent per year for rates not
set by agreement.'
33. S. MORGANSTERN, LEGAL REGULATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT 61 (1972). See also THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS, SURVEY OF STATE USURY LAWS (1975) (compilation
and summary of usury laws in United States, including District of Columbia).
34. See Chandler v. Kendrick, 146 So. 551, 552 (Fla. 1933); Carozza v. Federal Fin. &
Credit Co., 131 A. 332, 342 (Md. 1925); Ferdon v. Zarriello Bros., Inc., 208 A.2d 186, 191 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1965); Glenn v. McCarty, 130 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939),
aff'd, 138 Tex. 16, 155 S.W.2d 912 (1941).
35. See J. WEBB, LAW OF USURY 15 (1899). It has been said that the borrower and lender
cannot be deemed in pari delicto, and that pressure under which the borrower contracts is
great enough to eliminate the element of particeps criminis, meaning one who shares in the
crime. See Marshall v. Beeler, 178 P. 245, 247 (Kan. 1919).
36. See Declaration of Legislative Intent, 15 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. 1-2 (Vernon
1971). "It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this revision ... to protect the citizens
of Texas from abusive and deceptive practices now being perpetrated by unscrupulous opera" Id.
tors, lenders and vendors in both cash and credit consumer transactions ....
37. See TEx. CONST. art. Xfl, § 44 (1869). "All usury laws are abolished in this state,
and the Legislature is forbidden from making laws limiting the parties to contracts in the
" Id. The
amount of interest they may agree upon for loans of money or property ....
abolition of state usury laws toward the mid-1800's was a result of the free enterprise doctrines
that every man knew best how to defend his interest; therefore, governmental interference
was unnecessary. See TEx. CONsT. art XVI, § 11, comment (Vernon 1955). Furthermore, it
was believed that protection of the poor by the state from excess rates actually had the effect
of excluding them from sources of credit, and that restricted interest rates would result in a
shortage of capital, thus increasing the cost of credit. Id.
38. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11, comment (Vernon 1955).
39. See id.
40. See id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 4, Art. 6

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:825

The 1891 constitution directed the legislature to "provide appropriate
pains and penalties" to prevent usury.4 Although the provision made allowance for the legislature to define the criteria involved in a usurious
transaction and the penalties for usury, the legislature was nevertheless
bound by the constitutionally mandated ceiling of ten percent.2 In 1960,
the constitution was again amended"3 to allow the legislature greater flexibility in the regulation of interest-bearing transactions." As amended, article XVI, section 11 recognizes the importance of the legislative regulation
of credit in both consumer and commercial fields, and allows the legislature to formulate regulations and maximum interest rates for various types
of credit transactions.45
The legislature is thus authorized by the Constitution to regulate loans,
define interest, and fix maximum rates of interest. Pursuant to this authority, the legislature has enacted the Texas Credit Code which serves as
a guideline for regulation of interest bearing transactions in Texas. 7 The
Credit Code is supplemented by various statutory provisions regulating a
variety of institutions, including, but not limited to, national banks, savings and loan associations, corporations, credit unions, mutual loan companies, real estate companies, agricultural credit corporations, and agricultural livestock pools. 8
41. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11. It was subsequently held that this constitutional mandate only directed the legislature to do that which it already had the inherent power to do.
See Watts v. Mann, 187 S.W.2d 917, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd).
42. See TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11 (1891). "All contracts for a greater rate of interest
than ten per centum per annum, shall be deemed usurious.
...
Id.; cf. Galveston & W.
Ry. v. City of Galveston, 96 Tex. 520, 526, 74 S.W. 537, 540 (Tex. 1903) (constitution refers
only to contracts and does not limit legislature with regard to regulation of other rights).
43. See TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11.
44. See Wagner v. Austin Say. & Loan Ass'n, 525 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1975, no writ); Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A
Study of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 235 (1968).
45. See TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11, comment (Vernon 1955).
The ethical nature of the concept of usury renders it impossible to formulate
permanent and definite criteria of what constitutes a usurious transaction. As long as
freedom of contract remains the cornerstone of economic organization it is up to the
legislature to decide at what point a voluntary economic transaction constitutes an
abuse of economic freedom and thus an act of usury.
Id. Article XVI, § 11, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
The Legislature shall have authority to classify loans and lenders, license and regulate
lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates of interest; provided, however, in the
absence of legislation fixing maximum rates of interest all contracts for a greater rate
of interest than ten per centum (10%) per annum shall be deemed usurious; provided,
further, that in contracts where no rate of interest is agreed upon, the rate shall not
exceed six per centum (6%) per annum.
46. TEx. CONsT. art. XVI, § 11.
47. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01 to 50.01 (Vernon 1971).
48. The following chart lists the basic interest rates allowable under the credit code and
related statutes:
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5069-1.02, 1.04
(Vernon 1971)

Maximum rate of interest unless otherwise fixed by
law limited to 10% per annum; effective August 27,
1979, the rate will convert to a floating rate tied to one
percent above the discount rate on 90 day commercial
paper in effect on the day the loan is made at the
federal reserve bank in the federal reserve district
where the lender is located; in no case will the rate be
above twelve percent nor below ten percent.

5069-1.03
(Vernon 1971)

Legal rate applicable in absence of agreement between
parties: 6% per annum from date due on all written
contracts ascertaining a sum payable; 6% per annum
on open accounts from 1st of January after same are
made; effective August 27, 1979, accounts and
contracts will bear six percent legal interest from and
after the date when the sum is due and payable.

5069-1.05
(Vernon 1971) •

Judgments bear interest at 9% from date of judgment
unless otherwise specified in contract upon which
suit is based.

Loans of $500,000 or more made for interim financing
5069-1.07(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) for construction on real property or financing of
improved real property may bear interest at the
corporate rate: 11/ % per month; effective August 27,
1979, the "large loan" rate will be applicable to
all loans in the amount of $250,000 or more without
regard to security.
5069-1.07(c)
(Vernon Supp. 19781979)

Loans of $500,000 or more made for payment of direct
or indirect cost exploration for oil and gas may bear
interest at the corporate rate: 1 % per month.

5069-1.07 (d)
1979 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv., ch. 715,
§ 1, at 1766-68
(Vernon)

Loans secured by an interest in one to four family
dwellings may bear the lesser rate of: 1) twelve
percent, or 2) the average per annum market yield
adjusted to constant maturities on ten year U.S.
Treasury Notes plus two percent per annum rounded
off to the nearest quarter of one percent.
(effective from August 27, 1979 through
September 1, 1981)

5069-1.08
(Vernon Supp. 19781979)

Brokers & dealers registered under Federal Securities
and Exchange Act may charge 1 % per month on
monthly debit balance of customer's account if balance
is payable at will by the customer and secured by
stocks or other securities.

5069-1.09
(Vernon Supp. 19781979)

Loans insured by the FHA may bear interest
permitted by the National Housing Act; Loans insured
by the VA may bear rate permitted by the Veterans'
Benefits Code.
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5069-3.15
(Vernon 1971)

Regulated loans (loans under $2,500) made by licensee
under chapter 3 of the Texas Credit Code may bear
interest at the following add on rates:
(a) $18 per $100 per annum on portion of cash
advance under $300
(b) $8 per $100 per annum on portion of cash advance
in excess of $300 but not in excess of $2,500

5069-3.16
(Vernon 1971)

Alternative charges authorized for regulated loans
under $100:
(a) $0-29.99: charge of $1 for each $5 advanced
(b) $29.99-35: charge of 1/10 of cash advance plus
$3 monthly installment account handling charge
(c) $35-70: charge of 1/10 of cash advance plus $3.50
monthly installment account handling charge
(d) $70-100: charge of 1/10 of cash advance plus
$4 monthly installment account handling charge

5069-4.01(1)
(Vernon 1971)

Installment loans authorized at add on rate of $8 per
$100 per annum for the full term of the loan contract

5069-5.02
(Vernon 1971)

Secondary mortgage loans authorized at add on rate of
$8 per $100 per annum for the full term of the
loan contract

5069-6.02(9)
(Vernon 1971)

Retail installment contract payable in substantially
equal monthly installments may provide for a time
price differential in the following amounts:
(a) on principal balance under $500:
$12 per $100 per annum
(b) on principal balance from $500-1000:
$10 per $100 per annum
(c) on principal balance in excess of $1000:
$8 per $100 per annum

1302-2.09
(Vernon Supp. 1978)

Corporations (other than non-profit corporations) may
borrow at rate not to exceed 11/2 5 per month on
debt over $5000

1302-2.10
(Vernon Supp. 1978)

Agricultural credit corporation discounting loans with
Federal Intermediate Credit Bank may charge 3%
per annum plus the rate of discount promulgated by
the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks

2461-7.01
(Vernon Supp. 19781979)

Credit unions may make loans to members at a rate -not
exceeding 1/ per month on the unpaid monthly balance

2489a
(Vernon Supp. 19781979)

Agricultural livestock pools may charge interest on
loans of up to 11/2 /( over the rate of interest that the
pool is charged by the farm loan banks

2507
(Vernon 1965)

Mutual loan corporations organized to aid in the
production of agricultural products or livestock may
loan money and charge interest at a rate of up to
3% over the rate of discount established by the
Farm Credit Administration for discounts made by
Federal Intermediary Banks
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The power of the legislature to control interest rates, although quite
broad, is nevertheless subject to constitutional limitations. Thus, in the
absence of legislation to the contrary, the constitutional limit of ten percent controls. 9 Furthermore, the legislature, in the exercise of its authority
to "fix maximum rates of interest" may not authorize the collection of
charges that result in the elimination of an effective interest ceiling.5" In
authorizing exceptions to the general usury provisions and the statutory
definition of interest, the legislature is required to use language sufficient
to set a maximum rate allowable for the particular transactions involved.'
ELEMENTS OF USURY

Although constitutional and statutory provisions provide the framework
within which transactions bearing interest must fall, the provisions have
been annotated and interpreted by a voluminous body of case law. These
cases are the result of attempts to analyze the complex concept of interest,
clarify the scope of permissible usury regulation, and define areas in which
the statutes have been vague. From this case law has developed the general
requirement that four elements must be present to constitute usury: a
loan, forbearance or detention of money; an absolute obligation to repay
the principal; the exaction of a greater rate of interest than allowed by law;
and an intention to exact the usurious rate. 52
Loan, Forbearanceor Detention
Usury is presently defined as "interest in excess of the amount allowed
49. Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. 1979); Community
Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. State, 343 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. 1962).
50. See Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 907-08 (Tex.
1976). In Freeman, the supreme court found that a statute which purported to exclude
"premiums," or unlimited front-end fees charged on a loan, from the definition of interest
was ineffective to accomplish this result. "In the absence of language setting a maximum rate
for such charges or an appropriate modification of the definition of 'interest,' such 'premium'
charges will be deemed to constitute interest.
...
Id. at 908. The legislature is thus not
empowered to "legalize a subterfuge which enables lenders to charge varying rates in excess
of ten per cent per annum .
Community Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. State, 343 S.W.2d 232,
234 (Tex. 1961).
51. See Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 907-08 (Tex.
1976); Community Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. State, 343 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. 1961); St. Claire,
The "Spreading of Interest" Under The Acturial Method, 10 ST. MARty's L. J. 753, 782-84
(1979).
52. See, e.g., Sachs v. Ginsberg, 87 F.2d 28, 29 (5th Cir. 1936) (absolute obligation to
repay); Medical Arts Bldg. Co. v. Southern Fin. & Dev. Co., 29 F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1929)
(intention discussed); Crow v. Home Say. Ass'n, 522 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex. 1975) (loan or
forbearance); Christian v. Manning, 59 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1933),
modified, 124 Tex. 517, 81 S.W.2d 54 (1935) (exaction of usurious interest); C.C. Slaughter
Co. v. Eller, 196 S.W.704, 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1917, writ refd) (intentions of
parties).
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by law."' 3 Interest, as defined by the same Texas statute, is the
"compensation allowed by law for the use or forbearance or detention of
money." 5' Consequently, for a transaction to be considered usurious, there
must be a loan, forbearance or dentention of money. Texas case law has
consistently required at least one of the three as an essential element of
usury."
Illustrative of this point is Maloney v. Anqrews," in which the plaintiff
sought to recover unpaid rentals under a written lease agreement. The
defendant filed a counterclaim, contending that the agreed late charge of
one dollar per day was usurious. 7 The jury, however, failed to find usury
and awarded the plaintiff rent and attorney's fees." In affirming the lower
court's decision, the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals pointed out that for
usury statutes to apply a loan must be present." Since there was no loan,
the late fee was not interest charged on a loan, and the usury statutes were
inapplicable."0 In Vela v. Shaklett," the note sued upon was payable in
five years, with interest at ten percent per annum. A stipulation gave the
maker of the note the privilege of paying at the end of three years, if he
first paid a sum equal to three years advanced interest.2 Rejecting the
usury defense, the court rationalized that the provision for the prepayment
privilege was not a contract for the loan of money or forbearance of an
existing debt. 3
The court in Fisherv. Hoover' discussed the concept of a loan or forbearance in broad terms holding it to include "every written agreement" to pay
interest on a debt, whether the debt is assumed in the loan of money, the
sale of property, or in any other debtor-creditor transaction." The Texas
53. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(d) (Vernon 1971).
54. Id. art. 5069-1.01(a).
55. See Crow v. Home Say. Ass'n, 522 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex. 1975); Bexar Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 169, 12 S.W. 227, 228 (1890); Federal Mortgage Co. v. Davis,
100 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1936), aff'd, 131 Tex. 46, 111 S.W.2d 1066
(1938); A.Y. Creager Co. v. Horton, 96 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1936, no
writ); Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 453, 455-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1936, writ refd); Campbell v. Oskey, 239 S.W. 332, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1922, no
writ).
56. 483 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57. Id. at 703-04.

58. Id. at 703-04.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 704.
Id. at 705.
12 S.W.2d 1007 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, judgmt adopted).
Id.

63. Id. at 1008. A stipulation giving privilege of prepayment is not enough to constitute
usury unless the lender is entitled to demand prepayment. Here the provision merely gave
the debtor a valuable privilege of prepayment at his own option, by its nature not compensation for the use of money. Id. at 1008.
64. 21 S.W. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
65. Id. at 932.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss4/6

10

Smith: The Regulation of Interest; Practice and Procedure Early Regulati

19791

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the necessity for a finding of this element when it stated, "[iut is a fundamental principle governing the law
of usury that it must be founded on a loan or forbearance of money; if
neither of these elements exist, there can be no usury. '
Absolute Obligation to Repay Principal
The requirement that the borrower have an absolute obligation to repay
the principal of the loan may be a product of the historical differentiation
between ordinary risk taking in a business and the risk incident to a loan."7
In the Middle Ages, one was adjudged guilty of usury if he loaned any
money and required the borrower to repay principal and interest without
assuming a portion of the risk in the business in which the funds were
employed." Risk in that sense did not refer to the risk incident to a loan,
such as the possibility of the borrower's default.69 Rather, the risk was the
one that is usually associated with a capital investment, the return of
which, including both principal and dividend, is contingent on the success
or failure of the venture in question."0 The modern day manifestation of
such an interpretation of business risk is that usury may exist in a given
transaction only if repayment of the principal of the loan is an absolute
duty of the borrower, and not contingent upon the success or failure of the
business venture in which the debtor has employed the borrowed funds.7'
2
the loan was made under an agreeFor example, in Burton v. Stayner,1
ment providing that before repayment of principal and profits, expenses
incurred as a result of the investment would be deducted. 3 Applying the
absolute repayment requirement, the court held that the transaction was
not subject to the usury laws.7" Since repayment of the principal was contingent upon profits exceeding expenses, the transaction was classified as
an investment rather than a loan.75
Failure of the contract terms to stipulate explicitly that the principal is
66. Crow v. Home Say. Ass'n, 522 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex. 1975).
67. See generally Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A Study
of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 233-34 (1968).
68. Id. at 233.
69. Id. at 233-34.
70. Id. at 233-34.
71. See, e.g., Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 168, 14 S.W. 227, 228
(1890); Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1936, writ refd); Campbell v. Oskey, 239 S.W. 332, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1922, no
writ).
72. 182 S.W. 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1916, writ ref'd).
73. Id.
74. Id: at 395.
75. Id. at 395 (joint venture in which parties pooled. resources with hope of profiting; not
loan but merely advance of working capital).
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absolutely repayable will not always defeat a finding of usury." The defendant appealed an adverse judgement in Sachs v. Ginsberg,77 claiming that
the evidence did not support the finding that money advanced was absolutely and unconditionally repayable. Rejecting this contention, the court
looked beyond the form of the transaction, determining that appellants
actually contemplated the return of the money advanced."8 The intentional
effort by the appellants to omit the promise to repay was to no avail, since
the actual substance of the transaction was an absolute obligation incurred
by the borrower to repay the principal."9 It is apparent that courts will
apply the general rule and look through the form to the substance of the
transaction to ascertain specifically whether the principal is absolutely
repayable, and more generally, whether the transaction is usurious8(
Exaction of Usurious Interest
The third requisite for a finding of usury is the exaction, or taking, of
interest in excess of the maximum rate allowed for the use, forbearance,
or detention of money."' Exaction is defined as "the wrongful act . . . in
compelling payment of a fee or reward . . where no payment is due.""
Although the definition contemplates an "act," courts have generally held
that there may be exaction of usurious interest even though the interest
has not yet been paid.3 This concept is actually codified in the Texas
statutes under which a lender who "contracts for, charges or receives interest" greater than the amount allowed by law is subject to penalties for
usury.8 ' Thus a lender may "contract for" or "charge" usurious interest
rates, and without the actual receipt of funds be subject to penalties for
usury. 5
76. See Sachs v. Ginsberg, 87 F.2d 28, 29-30 (5th Cir. 1936).
77. 87 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1936).
78. Id. at 30.
79. Id. at 30.
80. See, e.g., Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex.
1976); Schmid v. City Nat'l Bank, 132 Tex. 115, 117, 114 S.W.2d 854, 855 (1938); Graham &
Locke Inv., Inc. v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
81. See, e.g., Walker v. Temple Trust Co., 124 Tex. 575, 577, 80 S.W.2d 935, 936 (1935);
Denton v. Ware, 228 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, no writ); Associates
Inv. Co. v. Baker, 221 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1949, writ dism'd).
82. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 664 (4th ed. 1951).
83. See Glenn v. McCarty, 130 S.W.2d 295, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939), aff'd,
137 Tex. 608, 155 S.W.2d 912 (1941); Dodson .v. Peck, 75 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1934, writ dism'd).
84. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
85. See, e.g., Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. 1974)
(contract for); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (charge).
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In a loan contract, although the duty to repay the principal amount must
be absolute, a contingency creating uncertainty about payment of usurious
interest may not defeat the applicability of usury regulations." It has been
said that usury "does not depend on the question whether the lender actually gets more than the legal rate of interest or not; but on . . . whether,
by the terms of the transaction . . . he may . . . be enabled to get more
than the legal rate. 87 In Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co.,"" failure of the borrower to pay any installment of principal or interest gave the
creditor the option to mature the entire debt. The usurious contingency
was the right of the creditor to charge unearned interest upon default of
the borrower. 9 Although the borrower had it within his power to prevent
payment of excess interest by promptly meeting installment deadlines, the
contingency remained as did the taint of usury. 0
On the other hand, the mere existence of a possibility that more than
the legal interest might be paid under a given contract will not invariably
invoke the usury laws. In WE. Grace Manufacturing Co. v. Levin,' the
principal and interest charges were fixed, but the term of the loan was
based on a contingency, and thus uncertain."2 Since the contingency was
reasonable, the Texas Supreme Court found that under the circumstances,
the legality of the contract should not depend on whether the loan might
be repaid at an early date shortening the term and thus raising the interest rate above ten percent. 3 The court therefore held that there was no
86. See Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 415-17, 30 S.W.2d 282,
285-86 (1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931); cf. Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 91
S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ refd) (usury laws inapplicable if
repayment of principal contingent).
87. Dodson v. Peck, 75 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934, writ dism'd)
(extensions, renewals, and commissions involved enabled lender to collect sum in excess of
legal rate of interest, although principal not due for years).
88. 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931).
89. Id. at 412-15, 30 S.W.2d at 285-86.
90. Id. at 412-15, 30 S.W.2d at 285-86.
91. 506 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1974).
92. Id. at 582. The loan was for $18,000, and a $500 handling charge agreed upon by the
parties was deemed to constitute interest. The parties also agreed that the advance would be
used by the debtor corporation to obtain certain goods that it had sold to a third party. The
third party's check for $25,000 in payment thereof was in turn to be indorsed to the lender to
repay the $18,000 advance and the $500 charge with the excess to be applied to a pre-existing
note between the parties. Id. at 584.
93. Id. at 584. Although the loan was actually paid in 22 days, resulting in an interest
charge of forty-five percent per annum, at trial the jury refused to find that the parties agreed,
either orally or in writing, that the loan would be repaid within 30 days. The supreme court
noted the absence of jury issues on whether the contract was a cloak to evade the usury laws
and whether the reasonable expectation of the parties was that the loan would be repaid
within 56 days, which was the minimum term that the loan could have run in order to remain
within the one and'one-half percent per month limit on corporate loans. In the absence of
these findings the court held that there was no contract for usurious interest. Id. at 583-84.
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contract for usurious interest although the loan was in fact paid early."
5
W.E. Grace, in conjunction with Shropshire,"
thus indicates that in an
action for usurious interest "contracted for," the right to exact usury by
contract must affirmatively appear."
A "charge" of excessive interest must also affirmatively appear in order
to satisfy the requirement of an exaction. 7 It has been held that by adding
usurious interest to the indebtedness," or by demanding payment of usurious interest as in a court pleading or notice of intent to reposess under a
security agreement, the lender has charged usurious interest." The charge
need not be made pursuant to an agreement, '0 but the lender must affirmatively represent that he considers the debtor to owe the usurious amount.
Thus, merely because a seller's invoice contains the words "11/2 % Charged
Each Month On Unpaid Balance," it will not constitute usury, if the
excessive interest is not actually added to the customer's account nor
demanded."'
94. Id. at 584. It should be noted, however, that although the court found, due to the
ambiguious contingency, that no usurious interest had been contracted for, because the
contingency occurred at such an early date the creditor was liable for penalties for usurious
interest received. Id. at 585.
95. Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 415-17, 30 S.W.2d 282, 28586 (1930) (contingency in contract by which lender may exact excessive interest renders
contract usurious), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931). In WE. Grace the court distinguished
Shropshire on the ground that in that case the contract expressly provided for the collection
of usurious unearned interest upon the debtor's default while in WE. Grace the parties
agreement and understanding regarding the contingent term of the note was uncertain. W.E.
Grace Mfg. Co. v. Levin, 506 S.W.2d 580, 584 (Tex. 1974).
96. The court in Shropshire noted the "universally accepted rule" that the court must
give to the terms of the contract, if susceptible thereto, a construction that would make it
legal. Shropshire v. Commercial Farm Credit Co., 39 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex.) (on motion for
rehearing), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931). The ambiguity concerning the specific agreement between the parties in WE. Grace permitted the court to impliedly use that principle
of validation and to give the contract a legal construction. See W.E. Grace Mfg. Co. v. Levin,
506 S.W.2d 580, 584 (Tex. 1974).
97. Compare Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 260-61 (Tex. 1977)
(unilateral addition of one and one-half percent monthly finance charge to customer's account
constitutes charging) with Killebrew v. Bartlett, 568 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ) (absent demand for payment or addition to customer's account, mere invoice terms providing for one and one-half percent monthly interest not charging).
98. See Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 219-20 (Tex. 1979); Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. 1977).
99. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Chasteen, 565 S.W.2d 342, 344-45 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Uresti, 553
S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank,
527 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex.. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
100. Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. 1977).
101. Thomas Conveyor Co. v. Portec, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1978, no writ); Killebrew v. Bartlett, 568 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978,
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Texas law is well settled regarding three further points involving the
exaction of usurious interest. First, it is not necessary to a finding of usury
that the interest exacted be monetary. 02 Courts may construe either property or services to be a type of interest, and the added value of the property
or service may cause a scheme to be usurious.0 3 Second, the inadvertent
collection of interest beyond what is due according to the contract will not,
by itself, cause illegality if an interpretation of the contract as a whole
shows no wrong.' 0' Finally, a finding that a usurious exaction is not the
result of a written agreement will not invalidate application of usury remedies.' Laws prohibiting usury apply to both written and oral agreements
with equal force, so long as the elements of usury appear. 00
Intention
The final element that must exist before usury can be found is an intention by the lender to exact more than the legal rate of interest on the
no writ). -In Killebrew the plaintiff's original petition contained a demand for the one and
one-half percent monthly interest that was allegedly charged, but the demand was omitted
by amendment. The court noted that the superseded petition could have been offered into
evidence as proof of a demand for usurious interest, but that in this case it had not been.
The court went on to hold that the language on the invoice, standing alone, did not constitute
"charging" excessive interest as a matter of law. Id. at 917.
102. See, e.g., Palmetto Lumber Co. v. Gibbs, 124 Tex. 615, 621-22, 80 S.W.2d 742, 745
(1935); Carder v. Knippa Mercantile Co., 1 S.W.2d 462, 463-64 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1927, writ dism'd); Sugg v. Smith, 205 S.W. 363, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1918, writ
ref'd); cf. Cochran v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 568 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1978, no writ). In Cochran the note provided for conventional interest at ten
percent, and the court noted that any additional interest would render the note usurious.
Although the lender had received options to purchase certain real estate as additional consideration for the loan, the court upheld the jury's findings that the options were of no monetary
value and therefore not usurious. Id. at 675.
103. See Palmetto Lumber Co. v. Gibbs, 124 Tex. 615, 621-22, 80 S.W.2d 742, 745 (1935);
Sugg v. Smith, 205 S.W. 363, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1918, writ refd). In Carder v.
Knippa Mfg. Co., I S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1927, writ dism'd), it was held
that the obligation of the borrower to plant a crop of oats for the lender, without charge for
the service, would not constitute usury, but only because the agreement for service was not a
part of the original loan contract. Id. at 463-64.
104. See, e.g., Goode v. Davis, 135 S.W.2d 285, 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939,
writ dism'd judgmt cor.); Federal Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 100 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1936), aff'd, 131 Tex. 46, 111 S.W.2d 1066 (1938); Continental Say. & Bldg.
Ass'n v. Wood, 33 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930), aff'd, 56 S.W.2d 641
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgmt adopted).
105. See People's Bldg., Loan & Say. Ass'n v. Keller, 50 S.W. 183, 186 (Tex. Civ. App.
1899, no writ) (holding that all contracts, oral or written, are usurious when greater than ten
percent per year interest provided for).
106. Id. at 186; see Autocredit of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Pritchett, 223 S.W.2d 951,953 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1949, writ dism'd); Glen v. McCarty, 130 S.W.2d 295, 301-02 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939), aff'd, 137 Tex. 608, 155 S.W.2d 912 (1941).
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loan. ' 7 The intent required has been described as "the intent to take and
reserve more than that permitted by statute for the loan.""", Although
decisions have discussed subjective intent,'"' Texas courts will usually look
objectively at the lending agreement to determine intent of the parties.'"'
Generally, two rules of interpretation are followed. First, when a contract
is fair and not illegal on its face, intent must clearly appear."' In other
words, a corrupt agreement, devise, or scheme to cover usury must be
shown, along with proof that it was in full contemplation of the parties at
the time of contracting." 2 On the other hand, when the contract is usurious
on its face, actual intent will not be required." 3 In situations when usury
is apparent, Texas courts have discussed intent as a requirement, but have
rarely required it when actually ascertaining whether usury was present."'
For example, the plaintiff in Campbell v. Oskey" 5 borrowed money from
the defendant to use in a certain business venture: Holding that an amount
of money paid to the lender constituted interest within the usury statutes,
the court rejected arguments that the amount paid was merely an advance
share of profits."' Upon rehearing the court discussed intent stating,
107. See, e.g., Medical Arts Bldg. Co. v. Southern Fin. & Dev. Co., 29 F.2d 969, 971 (5th
Cir. 1929); Moser v. John F. Buckner & Sons, 292 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1956, writ refd n.r.e.); Wellfare v. Realty Trust Co., 85 S.W.2d 1067, 1069 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1935, writ refd).
108. Joy v. Provident Loan Soc'y, 37 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1931,

writ dism'd).
109. See, e.g., Wellfare v. Realty Trust Co., 85 S.W.2d 1067, 1069 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1935, writ refd) (in usury questions matter of intentions control); C.C.
Slaughter Co. v. Eller, 196 S.W.704, 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1917, writ ref'd) (for usury
there must be an intention knowingly to contract for or to take usurious interest); Peightal
v. Cotton States Bldg. Co., 61 S.W. 428, 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no writ) (usury matter of
fact for jury to inquire and ascertain intent and motives).
110. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 492 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [lst Dist.] 1976), aff'd, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977); Dorfman v. Smith, 517 S.W.2d
562, 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ); Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857,
860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
111. See Moser v. John F. Buckner & Sons, 292 S.W.2d 669, 671-72 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Federal Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 100 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1936), aff'd, 131 Tex. 46, 111 S.W.2d 1066 (1938).
112. See Moser v. John F. Buckner & Sons, 292 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1956, writ refd n.r.e.); C.C. Slaughter Co. v. Eller, 196 S.W. 704, 708 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1917, writ refd).
113. See, e.g., Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89,98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977), aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d
209, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Townsend v. Adler, 510 S.W.2d 175,
176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
114. See Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977), aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d
209, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
115. 239 S.W. 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1922, no writ).
116. Id.
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"[wihere . . . the contract upon its very face imports usury, as by an
express reservation of more than legal interest, there is no room for presumption, for the intent is apparent; res ipsa loquitur.""' 7
As evidenced by recent case law, courts have eliminated the necessity
of finding actual intent on the part of the parties in order to find usury.""
In Miller v. FirstState Bank"' intent was held to mean intent to make the
bargain made, rather than intent to charge a usurious rate of interest.', "
The bank, therefore, was found to have had the intent necessary because
it intended to make the loan agreement, notwithstanding testimony that
it did not intend to exact usurious interest and that no devise or scheme
was conceived for that purpose. 2 ' The logical result of this ruling is that
in all cases in which a contract is intended, although the parties are not
aware of its usurious nature, intent will be imputed, and the lender will
suffer the same penalties as if he had intentionally contrived the scheme
of usury. It can therefore be generally said that subjective intent is immaterial and intent will be presumed by the courts if an objective examination of the documents and the actual transaction reflects usury.'
There are, however, exceptions to this rule of presumed intent.', 3 Although a contract is usurious on its face, it will not be held usurious if there
is a showing of fraud, accident, or mistake as a defense.' 4 While not sub117. Id. at 334. The evidence showed an absolute obligation on the part of the borrower
to repay the $750 advanced, plus an additional sum of $300 interest as interpreted by the
court. Id. at 334.
118. See, e.g., Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977), aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d
209, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ refd n.r.e.); Townsend v. Adler, 510 S.W.2d 175,
176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1974, no writ).
119. 551 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977), aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d
572 (Tex. 1978).
120. Id. at 98.
121. Id. at 98; see Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Townsend v. Adler, 510 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ); Donoghue v. State, 211 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Townsend v. Adler, 510 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ), the court ordered forfeiture of all that was
due on the note since the lender clearly intended to make the bargain made, although he was
ignorant of the usury laws.
122. See, e.g.,. Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 492 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), aff'd, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977); Johns v. Jaeb, 518
S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
123. For an in-depth discussion of the defenses of fraud, accident, or mistake, see text
accompanying notes 303-321, infra.
124. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lumpkin, 241 S.W. 220, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1922,
no writ) (accrued interest at rate greater than ten percent held not usurious due to fraud or
mistake); Western Bank & Trust Co. v. Ogden, 93 S.W. 1102, 1104 (Tex. Civ. App.-1906,
no writ) (when mistake made in calculation of interest party not liable for penalty); Henry
v. Sanson, 21 S.W. 69, 70-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-1893, no writ) (because payee was seriously
ill, mutual mistake existed, and note held not usurious but subject to reformation).
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jecting the lender to statutory penalties, the contract will be reformed, or
subjected to reformation by the courts. 2 5 Ignorance of the law, however,
will not constitute a bona fide error, relieving the lender from the penalties
12
for usury violations.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Pleadings
A plea of usury is available either as a defensive offset to an action on a
note or an affirmative action against the creditor based on an exaction of
excess interest.' If the borrower avails himself of the usury defense, it is
imperative that he plead the facts that render the contract sued upon
usurious.' 8 Likewise, when the usury action is affirmative, whether the
petition is to recover usurious interest paid or a claim demanding the
statutory penalty, the allegation of usury must be pled in the petition.'25
In either case, the plea must set forth, with definiteness and specificity,
the material facts showing usury.3 0 The party alleging usury should, in the
125. See Shaw v. Lumpkin, 241 S.W. 220, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1922, no
writ); Western Bank & Trust Co. v. Ogden, 93 S.W. 1102, 1104 (Tex. Civ. App.-1906, no
writ); Henry v. Sanson, 21 S.W. 69, 70-71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
126. See Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857, 860-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
127. See, e.g., Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921-22 (Tex.
1976); Employees Loan Co. v. Templeton, 109 S.W.2d 774, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1937, no writ); Mercer v. Bonner Loan & Inv. Co., 73 S.W.2d 988, 989 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1934, no writ).
128. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 93 (1) (evidence of usury defense inadmissible in absence of
verified plea). A pleading.of usury is required in order to put an opponent on notice that it
will be used at trial as a defense. See Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d
918, 922 (Tex. 1976). It should also be noted that the plaintiff's petition itself may be the
charge of excessive interest that gives rise to the defendant's cause of action on which the
counterclaim or defense is based. See Killebrew v. Bartlett, 568 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, no writ). The usury defense must be raised at trial on an action on a note,
and once judgment on the note is rendered it cannot be collaterally attacked on the ground
of usury. See Mercer v. Bonner Loan & Inv. Co., 73 S.W.2d 988, 989 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1934, no writ). The debtor may, however, bring a subsequent affirmative action to
recover statutory penalties.. See id. at 989.
129. See, e.g., Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co. 91 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1936, writ ref'd); Korth v. Tumlinson, 73 S.W.2d 1048, 1049 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ); Gibson v. Hicks, 47 S.W.2d 691, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-E
Paso 1932, no writ). See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 45. Pleadings shall "consist of a statement in
plain and concise language of the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's grounds of
defense." Id.
130. See Stanford v. United States Inv. Corp., 272 S.W. 568, 569-70 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1925, writ dism'd) (appellant's petition held insufficient to charge usury since
it failed to allege sufficiently definite facts to demonstrate usurious interest); Interstate Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Bryan, 54 S.W. 377, 378 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ) (general allegation
that loan was set up to evade usury laws will not support judgment finding usury when
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petition or answer, set forth all of the usurious terms of the transaction,
show the loan or forbearance with an absolute obligation to repay the
principal, and specify the method whereby interest in excess of the legal
maximum is contracted for, charged or received.'3 '
Rule 93 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading
of usury in defense to a suit on a contract must be verified by affidavit,
unless the truth of usury appears on the record.'32 One of the issues in Wall
v. East Texas Teachers Credit Union'33 was whether the appellant's pleadings were sufficient to allow him to receive statutory penalties for the
lender's usury. The appellant pled only that the plaintiff's suit, to collect
on a promissory note, was based on an illegal loan and in violation of state
statutes.' 4 His plea, however, was not verified.3 5 By simple mathematical
averments fail to disclose proper facts). In addition to his pleadings, the party alleging usury
should request that the issue be submitted to the jury, and should tender such an issue to
the court in writing. Unless the issue is requested and submitted, or the matter is conclusively
established under the evidence, recovery for usury is waived on appeal under rule 279. See
Sudderth v. Howard, 560 S.W.2d 511, 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Tax. R. Civ. P. 279.
131: In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Foster, 66 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1933,
writ dism'd), the court, after noting that usury must be specifically pled, refused to allow
introduction into evidence, over objection, of a second agreement as part of the original
usurious contract. Although the transaction taken as a whole could have constituted usury,
plaintiff's pleadings, and thus his evidence, were limited to the original contract. Id. at 431;
see Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936,
writ ref'd) (in action to recover usurious interest paid, allegation of unconditional promise to
repay alleged loan held insufficient); Korth v. Tumlinson, 73 S.W.2d 1048, 1049 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ) (petition failing to show borrower's absolute agreement to
repay and not setting forth terms of usurious contract held not sufficient); cf. United Fin.
Corp. v. Smith, 128 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939, writ dism'd). Under the
old general demurrer practice, a petition was required to contain allegations "which in express
terms or by reasonable inference are sufficient to admit evidence of every fact necessary to
be proved." Id. at 420. Failure of the petition to set out the particulars of the usurious
agreement was subject to special exception, but not to general demurrer. Id. at 420; Cotton
v. Thompson, 159 S.W. 455, 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1913, no writ).
132. TEx. R. Civ. P. 93 (1). On appeal, unless the defendant has filed a verified plea of
his usury defense, or unless the truth of his allegations appear of record, the reviewing court
will consider the point waived. See Scurlock v. Lovvorn, 410 S.W.2d 525, 532 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1966, no writ); Broadway Plan v. Ravenstein, 364 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1963, writ refd n.r.e.).
133. 526 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 533
S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1976).
134. Id. at 151.
135. Id. at 151. A defensive plea of usury is required to be verified for two reasons. The
plea itself serves to put the plaintiff on notice that the defense will be raised. The requirement
of verification, however, is intended to have a deterrent effect. Dilatory pleas and defenses
on the merits that are groundless are discouraged by the rule 93 requirement that they be
made under oath. Tax. R. Civ. P. 93, comment (Vernon 1967). The courts have held, in
accordance with this reasoning, that in an affirmative action to recover usury penalties the

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

19

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 4, Art. 6

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:825

calculations the court discerned that the note was usurious on its face;
therefore, failure to specifically plead usury by verified affidavit did not
affect a finding of usury.' On appeal, the supreme court noted that the
plaintiff, who had written the note that was usurious on its face, should
have been on notice that the defense of usury would be raised.'37
In addition to a plea of usury, the petition or answer should contain
specific prayers for additional or inconsistent remedies.' 3' In First State
Bank v. Miller'3' the Texas Supreme Court held that the usury statutes do
not provide for a refund of usurious interest paid in addition to the statutory penalty of twice the interest contracted for, charged, or received.1'1
Since the debtor did not plead for recovery of interest paid, and the issue
was not tried by consent, the court cited the general rule that a party must
allege his cause of action to sustain a judgment thereon, and disallowed
recovery of interest paid."' Similarly, in Burnett v. James,"' the Dallas
Court of Civil Appeals refused to grant the remedy of rescission of contract,
upon a plea for damages and general relief under the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act."3
petition need not be verified. See Texas Acceptance Corp. v. Simpson, 154 S.W.2d 281, 282
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, no writ); United Fin. Corp. v. Smith, 128 S.W.2d 419, 420
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939, writ dism'd).
136. Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 526 S.W.2d 148, 151-52 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1975), rev'd on othergrounds, 533 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1976). Compare Thrift Fin.
Co. v. State, 351 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ rerd n.r.e.) (unverified
petition alleging usury sufficient if supported by detailed allegations and undisputed evidence) with Reese v. Interstate Sec. Co., 301 S.W.2d 480, 482-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1957, writ dism'd) (unsworn pleadings and affidavits by interested witnesses based on legal
conclusions and not evidentiary facts insufficient to defeat summary judgment).
137. Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. 1976).
138. See, e.g., First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1978); Burnett
v. James, 564 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ dism'd); Miles v. W.C.
Roberts Lumber Co., 561 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
In Miles, the plaintiff brought suit on a sworn account. The defendant filed a sworn general
denial and a plea of avoidance based on usury, but failed to deny the justness of the account
as a whole, or the specifics of the unjustness as required by rule 185 of the rules of civil
procedure. The court held that the usury plea did not meet the requirements of rule 185, and
as a consequence the defendant had admitted that the account was correct. Id. at 259; see
Tax. R. Civ. P. 185.
139. 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978).
140. Id. at 576-77. The Miller case is discussed at footnotes 246-256 infra and accompanying text.
141. Id. at 576-77. The Miller court expressly reserved opinion, however, on whether a
separate plea in the nature of a common law action was available for recovery of usury paid.
Id. at 576-77; see Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495. (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976) (recovery of usury paid granted under plea therefor), revd
on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
142. 564 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ dism'd).
143. Id. at 409. The court noted that since rescission of a contract is inconsistent with a
claim for damages under the same contract, rescission must be specifically prayed for. Id. at
409.
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Venue
Venue for usury actions is controlled by provisions in the Texas Credit
Code."' The code provides for five alternative venue facts: that the suit was
brought in the county of the defendant's residence, in the county in which
the excess interest was received or collected, in the county in which the
transaction was entered into, in the county in which the party who paid
usurious interest resided at the time of the transaction, or in the country
in which the party who paid usurious interest resides at the time of the
action."5 These requirements for venue are stated in the disjunctive, and
the plaintiff must allege and prove at least one to maintain venue in the
forum he has selected." ' There is conflict, however, among court of civil
appeals decisions concerning whether the plaintiff must also prove, as
an additional venue fact, that the transaction in question is actually
usurious."17 In Donald v. Agriculture Livestock Finance Corp.,46 the Fort
Worth Court of Civil Appeals held that once one or more of the necessary
venue facts are established, there is no additional burden upon the plaintiff to prove the actual exaction of usurious interest."' The Beaumont
Court of Civil Appeals, however, in National Mortgage Corp. v. Maxwell,' "
held that when the plaintiff seeks to establish venue in the county in
which the transaction was entered into, but does not reside in that county,
he must prove both that the transaction was entered into in that county
and that it was usurious.' Both cases relied upon the same 1937 supreme
court case, Universal Credit Co. v. Dunklin,5 2 as authority for their conclusion.' Although it is well settled that a plaintiff must, in order to
144. TEx. Rxv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(3) (Vernon 1971); see id. art. 1995 (30)
(Vernon 1964); cf. id. art. 5069-8.04 (Vernon 1971) (venue provisions under consumer credit
section of the code).
145. Id. art. 5069-1.06(3) (Vernon 1971).
146. See, e.g., Universal Credit Co. v. Dunklin, 129 Tex. 324, 327, 105 S.W.2d 867, 868
(1937) (plea of privilege prima facie evidence of defendant's right to change venue, and after

its filing, burden on plaintiff to allege and prove venue facts); Hamilton Inv. Trust v. Hi
Fashion Wigs Profit Sharing Trust, 559 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no
writ) (proper plea of privilege shifts burden to plaintiff to plead and prove proper venue);
Donald v. Agricultural Livestock Fin. Corp., 495 S.W.2d 592, 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1973, no writ) (plaintiff must prove one or more venue facts).
147. Velasquez v. Schehle, 562 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no
writ). The Velasquez court noted the conflict of authority, but held that under either theory
the plaintiff had successfully controverted the defendant's plea of privilege. Id. at 3.
148. 495 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no writ).
149. Id. at 597; accord, Allied Fin. Co. v. Miro, 568 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1978, no writ).

150. 541 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
151. Id. at 626-27.
152. 129 Tex. 324, 105 S.W.2d 867 (1937).
153. See National Mortgage Corp. of America v. Maxwell, 541 S.W.2d 626, 626 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ); Donald v. Agricultural Livestock Fin. Corp., 495 S.W.2d
592, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no writ). The Donald court cited Dunklin and
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controvert a plea of privilege, 5 ' plead and prove the essential venue
facts," 5 the identification of the essential venue facts is not so easily
accomplished. As the law now stands, the plaintiff need only show ,that
residence actually exists in order to sue in the county of the defendant's
residence or that of his own. 56 On the other hand, when suit is filed in the
county in which the transaction was entered into, the plaintiff must plead
and prove that venue fact as well as prove the transaction was usurious.' 7
EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND ADMISSIBILITY

As a general rule courts will presume that in a given transaction the law
has been upheld; therefore, a judicial presumption exists in usury cases
that the interest charged or to be collected is within legal limits, and that
the transaction is untainted with usury.' 8 The maxim that he who alleges
Ballard v. Shock for the proposition that the court need only refer to the allegations regarding
usury, and that the plaintiff has no burden of proving the merits of his claim in order to
controvert a plea of privilege. Id. at 596. The Ballard court did so hold, but then withdrew
its opinion and on rehearing held that proof that the contract is actually usurious is an
essential venue fact under the statute providing for venue in the county in which the usurious
contract was entered into. See Ballard v. Shock, 91 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1934, no writ). Thus the Fort Worth court's reliance upon Ballard is misplaced. The reliance upon Dunklin is similarly erroneous since the supreme court in Dunklin
cited Ballard only for the proposition that venue facts must be proven, and did not consider
the question of proof of actual usury. See Universal Credit Co. v. Dunklin, 129 Tex. 324, 327,
105 S.W.2d 867, 868 (1937); cf. Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232, 237, 88 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1935)
(proof that offense was actually committed is essential venue fact to establish venue in county
of offense).
154. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 86.
155. See, e.g., Universal Credit Co. v. Dunklin, 129 Tex. 324, 327, 105 S.W.2d 867, 868
(1937); Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232, 237, 88 S.W. 91, 93 (1935); Hamilton Inv. Trust v.
Hi Fashion Wigs Profit Sharing Trust, 559 S.W.2d 376, 377-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977,
no writ).
156. See Allied Fin. Co. v. Miro, 568 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no
writ); Donald v. Agricultural Livestock Fin. Corp., 495 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-1973
Fort Worth, no writ).
157. National Mortgage Corp. of America v. Maxwell, 541 S.W.2d 626, 626 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ). The two other venue provisions of article 5069-1.06(3) have
not yet been the subject of appellate decisions. However, repealed article 5073, 1963 Tex. Gen.
Laws, ch. 205, § 26, at 550, which was replaced by section 1.06(3) contained similar provisions
for venue in the county in which the usurious interest was received or collected, and the
county in which the party paying usurious interest resided when the transaction occurred. In
Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Mitchell, 313 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958, no
writ), the court held that the plaintiff was required to show both that the contract was
usurious, and that he was a resident of the county in which the suit was brought at the time
the transaction was entered into in order to maintain venue in that county. See Woodman v.
Bishop, 203 S.W.2d 977, 977-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947, no writ).
158. See Walker v. Temple Trust Co., 124 Tex. 575, 579, 80 S.W.2d 935, 936 (1935);
Miner v. Paris Exchange Bank, 53 Tex. 559, 561 (1880); Amaya v. First State Bank, 570
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must prove is applicable to cases in which usury is alleged, whether asserted as a defense or as an affirmative action for recovery of interest or
penalties.'59 Apart from the presumption that the parties intended to observe and obey the law, Texas courts adhere to other general presumptions.
Lenders of money are, as a rule, presumed to be able to recognize a usurious transaction when they see it, and are held to be on notice of its
illegality.'6 0 Also, when facts and circumstances surrounding a contract
clearly denote the existence of usury, a court will conclusively presume
that the transaction was intended to be usurious. '
When usury is at issue, rules of admissibility of evidence are liberally
applied by the courts, allowing inquiry into the actual truth behind the
transaction.'6 All evidence surrounding the transaction that will shed light
upon the issue or tend to show the true character of the transaction is
admissible, regardless of whether the agreement appears fair.' 3 If courts
S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ); Miller v. First State Bank, 551
S.W.2d 89, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977), aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.
1978); Hernandez v. United States Fin. Co., 441 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1969, writ dism'd); Emerson v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 107 S.W.2d 1029, 1031 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1937, writ dism'd).
159. See, e.g., Mays v. Pierce, 154 Tex. 486, 489, 281 S.W.2d 79, 82 (1955); Miller v. First
State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977), aff'd as modified, 563
S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978); American Century Mortgage Inv. v. Regional Center, Ltd., 529
S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ refd n.r.e.). When a contract shows no
usury on its face, the burden of proof is on the party pleading it to show some agreement,
devise, or subterfuge to exact usury. See, e.g., Griffin v. Stewart, 348 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, no writ); Mathes v. Walker, 66 S.W.2d 1093, 1094 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1933, writ dism'd); American Mortgage Corp. v. Dunnam, 59 S.W.2d
1095, 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933, writ dism'd).
160. See Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977), aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978). In Townsend v. Adler, 510 S.W.2d 175,
176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ), the lender was unaware of the
state's usury laws. The court nevertheless found the transaction to be usurious, and charged
the lender with the penalties therefor. Id. at 176.; cf. North Am. Acceptance Corp. v. Warren,
451 S.W.2d 921, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ refd n.r.e.) (lender's assignee presumed to know public policy of state regarding interest contracts).
161. See Graham & Locke Inv., Inc. v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234, 243 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Maxwell v. Estate of Bankston, 433 S.W.2d 229, 233
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, no writ) (unnecessary to presume when intent is apparent).
'162. See General Southwestern Corp. v. State, 333 S.W.2d 164,
168 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); State v. Abbot Loan Serv., 195 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A liberal construction is applied by the court
since generally the best evidence is in the possession of the creditor, and not readily available
to the plaintiff. See Consumers Discount Corp. v. State, 352 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1961, writ refd n.r.e.).
163. See Peightal v. Cotton States Bldg. Co., 61 S.W. 428, 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no
writ). This rule stems from the requirement that the debtor, in order to establish usury in a
transaction valid on its face, must establish a corrupt scheme or agreement between the
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strictly construed admissibility rules, schemes and devices of the usurer
might remain unexposed, and regulatory statutes might become ineffective. ' A liberal approach is therefore taken. Thus, parol or extrinsic evidence is admissible for the purpose of proving usury, 65 even though the
parol evidence contradicts a portion of the party's writings. 6 Likewise,
expert testimony is admissibile to determine the true charge of interest and
whether the exaction exceeded the rate allowed by law.'67 Evidence of
usage.or custom relating to interest charges in similar transactions may be
admitted to show the actual understanding of the parties, but usage or
custom possesses only evidentiary value when a fixed habit or custom is
established by that evidence.' Unlike other rules of admissibility, however, the hearsay rule is strictly construed; thus, hearsay as to similar
contracts of third parties is inadmissible on the issue of usury. '
In accordance with the rule applicable to other civil actions, the party
alleging usury must establish its existence by a preponderance of the eviparties to conceal usury. See Moss v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 533 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ); General Southwestern Corp. v. State, 333
S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960, writ refd n.r.e.).
164. See, e.g., F.B. & D. Inc. v. Nathan Alterman Elec. Co., 394 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Farris v. Maisen, 371 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963, no writ); Southern Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winans, 60 S.W.
825, 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ); cf. General Southwestern Corp. v. State, 333 S.W.2d
164, 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (best evidence of usury generally
in possession of accused).
165. See, e.g., Day v. Garland Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 460 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 170, no writ); F.B. & D. Inc. v. Nathan Alterman Elec. Co., 394 S.W.2d 821,
823 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); National Bond & Inv. Co. v.
Atkinson, 254 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ dism'd).
166. F.B. & D. Inc. v. Nathan Alterman Elec. Co., 394 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). "The parol evidence rule is no obstacle to showing
that a writing which appears valid on its face is, in fact, a mask for usury." Id. at 823. Thus,
contemporaneous parol agreements may be shown although the written contract is not usurious on its face. See Smith v. Stevens, 81 Tex. 461, 463, 16 S.W. 986, 987 (1891); Roberts v.
Coffin, 53 S.W. 597, 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ); cf. Graham & Locke Inv., Inc. v.
Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, writ refd n.r.e.) (contemporaneous instruments executed as part of same transaction are considered together as single
instrument).
167. See Acme Letter Shop v. State, 342 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
168. See Nocona Nat'l Bank v. Bolton, 143 S.W. 242, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1912, no writ). In a civil case, however, oral evidence given in denial of usurious intent is
without force when contrasted with proven contractual provisions providing for usurious
charges. Evidence of custom or usage is also inadmissible for the purpose of contravening a
statute. See Kollman v. Hunnicutt, 385 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964,
no writ).
169. See Western Bank & Trust Co. v. Ogden, 93 S.W. 1102, 1104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906,
no writ) (trial court erred by permitting plaintiff to testify about certain hearsay statements
made by third party in contract similar to one made with defendant).
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849

dence.7 ° At trial the question of usury is generally one of fact, although
sometimes it may be one of law. When the contract does not appear to be
usurious on its face, the issue is one of fact for the jury. 7 ' Alternatively,
when the agreement indicates usury on its face or when the evidence is
insufficient to raise a jury issue, the inquiry becomes one of law for the
court.'
CONFLICT OF LAWS

Rules governing questions about conflict of laws have received great

attention in recent years, and three general theories have appeared'. According to the traditional view, the law of the forum in which the contract
was made determines the validity and legality of the contract, unless the
place of performance is different, and then the laws of the state of perform-

ance govern."' The second theory holds that when the parties have not
stipulated which laws are to apply, the laws of the jurisdiction with the

most significant relationship with the transaction will be applied.' 7' The

third theory, the governmental interest approach, is based on a determination of whether the forum state has a legitimate interest in the application
of its laws. 7 5 When the law of another state might also be applied the court
first looks at local policy, then ascertains whether the local contacts are
170. See Griffin v. Steward, 348 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, no
writ) (clear and convincing evidence requires at least a preponderance); cf. Great S. Life Ins.
Co. v. Williams, 105 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937, no writ) (fact of usury
must be established by at least clear and convincing evidence). For cases holding evidence
to be sufficient to show usury, or to submit issue to jury see: Brem v. Cook, 147 Tex. 374,
376-77, 216 S.W.2d 179, 180 (1949); Autocredit of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Pritchett, 223 S.W.2d
951, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1949, writ dism'd); Marsh v. Tiller, 293 S.W. 223, 224
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1927, no writ).
171. See, e.g., National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Mahaney, 124 Tex. 544, 555, 80
S.W.2d 947, 953 (1935); Mitchell v. Napier, 22 Tex. 120, 129 (1858); Cotton v. Cooper, 160
S.W. 597, 601 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1913), aff'd, 209 S.W. 135 (Teax. Comm'n App.
1919, judgmt adopted).
172. See, e.g., Chandler v. Guaranty Mortgage Co., 89 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1935, no writ) (directed verdict for plaintiff held proper when evidence
did not raise jury issue); Mitchell v. Schimming & Eddins, 52 S.W.2d 1080, 1081-82 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1932, no writ) (evidence insufficient to raise jury issue); Peightal v. Cotton
States Bldg. Co., 61 S.W. 428, 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no writ) (when evidence shows
transaction to be per se usurious court may charge jury to that effect).

173.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§ 332, 358 (1934).

174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 186-89 (1971).
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if it provides
for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the contract has a substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate permitted by the general usury
law of the state of the otherwise applicable law . . ..
Id. § 203.
175. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs L. Rv. 657, 667-68
(1959).
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sufficient to support that policy.' Balancing local interest with the policy,
contacts, and interest of the other state, the court retains jurisdiction
unless insufficient local policies or contacts exist to warrant retention.' 77
When usury laws conflict there exists a well-established rule, called the
"rule of validation."' 78 According to this rule, a contract for the payment
of interest will be validated, whenever possible, by applying the more
lenient usury statute of any state sufficiently connected with the con"
' It has been contended, however, that this special conflicts rule is
tract. 79
neither well-established nor undisputed and that its "deceptive simplicity" stands "as a barrier to intelligent appraisals of conflicting state policies." 8 0
In the United States, there exists the long standing principle that interest rates are governed by the forum in which the contract is made, the debt
is incurred, or the debt is to be paid.' 8' The Supreme Court in Seeman v.
Philadelphia Warehouse Co.' held that the general principle applicable
to agreements in which the place of performance and of contracting differed would be that the parties could contract for rates valid in either
forum.8 3 If the parties have acted in good faith, and the legal interest
permitted in the place set for performance is greater than the legal rate in
the contracting location, parties may properly stipulate the higher rate of
interest, without incurring usury penalties.'8 '
A state may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders when
no part of the transaction occurred within its borders. 81 5 Following this
Supreme Court mandate, it was held in Apodaca v.Banco Longoria, S.A. 'l
that although the note sued upon bore eighteen percent maturity interest,
Texas law was not applicable since the note was both executed and made
176. Id. at 667-68.
177. Id. at 667-68.
178. See Note, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of the Lex Debitoris, 55 CAL.
L. REV. 123, 125 (1967).

179. See Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1955).
180. See Note, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of the Lex Debitoris, 55 CAL.
L. REV. 123, 125 (1967).
181. See, e.g., Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 407-08 (1927);
Bedford v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 181 U.S. 227, 242-43 (1901); Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 298, 310 (1863). See also Apodaca v. Banco Longoria, S.A., 451 S.W.2d 945, 947
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
182. 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
183. Id. at 407-08.
184. Id. at 407-08. Conversely, if the legal rate of interest is higher in the place of
contracting than at the place for performance, the parties may, in good faith, establish the
higher rate. Id. at 408; see Bedford v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 181 U.S. 227, 242-43 (1901);
Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 298, 310 (1863).
185. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930) (laws of state will apply only if
contract made out of state is to be performed in the state).
186. 451 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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payable in Mexico.'87 Likewise, in Braniff Investment Co. v. Norton'" the
court found Texas usury laws inapplicable. Because the note executed in
Texas was made payable in Oklahoma, the court held Oklahoma usury
laws applicable, notwithstanding the existence of an option making the
note payable elsewhere, since that option had never been exercised. 189
Texas courts have generally accepted the holding that interest rates
under agreements are to be governed by, the laws of the state where the
contract is made or performed.9 0 In Securities Investment Co. v. Finance
Acceptance Corp.' the creditor was a Missouri corporation, the loan
agreement with the borrower was made in Missouri, and the lender had
no office in Texas. The court ruled the provision in the contract that laws
of Missouri were to govern the agreement, was not invalid as a subterfuge
to evade Texas usury laws." 2 Furthermore, Texas follows the accepted rule
that when citizens of different states contract a debt, they may contract
with reference to the laws of either state.'93 Finally, Texas follows the
general principle concerning a contract made in one place and to be performed wholly in another state.'94 The validity of these contracts is ordinarily to be governed by the law of the place of performance.' 95 In Andrews
v. Hoxie'" a bona fide loan contract was made in Texas to be executed in
Louisiana. Although the interest rate stipulated was greater than the legal
maximum rate for Texas, the transaction was not held usurious since
187. Id. at 946. See also McCans v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 179 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1944, no writ) (Texas law not applicable since contract made and
performed in Minnesota).
188. 80 F.2d 598, 598-99 (5th Cir. 1935).
189. Id. at 598-99. Contra, Braniff Inv. Co. v. Robertson, 74 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1934), rev 'd, 81 S.W.2d 45 (1935) (held place of payment clause not effective
in making note payable there; therefore, forum's laws did not apply).
190. See Building & Loan Ass'n v. Griffin, 90 Tex. 480, 490, 39 S.W. 656, 660 (1897) (rule
based on comity existing between states); Apodaca v. Banco Longoria, S.A., 451 S.W.2d 945,
947 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (note execuuted and to be paid in another
country).
191. 474 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
192. Id. at 272.
193. Dugan v. Lewis, 79 Tex. 246, 253, 14 S.W. 1024, 1026 (1891) (usury laws cannot be
evaded under cover of naming a state whose laws are to control); Securities Inv. Co. v.
Financial Acceptance Corp., 474 S.W.2d 261, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (law designated by parties to govern the contract will apply if it has a
reasonable relationship to the contract). See generally Building & Loan Ass'n v. Griffin, 90
Tex. 480, 488-89, 39 S.W. 656, 659 (1897) (example of pretense or devise tacked onto Texas
contract to avoid Texas usury law).
194. See Dugan v. Lewis, 79 Tex. 246, 250-52, 14 S.W. 1024, 1025 (1891); Andrews v.
Hoxie, 5 Tex. 171, 186-87 (1849); Grace v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279, 293
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
195. See Andrews v. Hoxie, 5 Tex. 171, 186-87 (1849); Grace v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
255 S.W.2d 279, 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
196. 5 Tex. 171 (1849).
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